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A	deadly	omission	(among	other	things)	
•  20	August	2008:	MD-82	on	takeoﬀ	from	Madrid	
–  Flaps	not	set	for	takeoﬀ	
	
A	deadly	omission	(among	other	things)	
•  20	August	2008:	MD-82	on	takeoﬀ	from	Madrid	
–  Flaps	not	set	for	takeoﬀ	
•  NASA	ASRS:	since	2000,	pilots	have	reported		their	failure	
to	properly	set	the	ﬂaps	for	takeoﬀ	over	70	Tmes!	
Hanging	by	a	thread…	
•  ASRS	#658970,	night	of	May	2005,	DCA	
•  DCA,	VMC		
•  Crew	of	B737-800	reporTng:	
•  “..	As	we	started	the	taxi,	I	called	for	the	taxi	checklist,	but	
became	confused	about	the	route	and	queried	the	ﬁrst	
oﬃcer	to	help	me	clear	up	the	discrepancy.	We	discussed	
the	route	and	conTnued	the	taxi...			We	were	cleared	for	
takeoﬀ	from	runway	1,	but	the	ﬂight	acendant	call	chime	
wasn't	working.	I	had	called	for	the	Before	Takeoﬀ	
checklist,	but	this	was	interrupted	by	the	communicaTons	
glitch.	..	On	takeoﬀ,	rotaTon	and	lifoﬀ	were	sluggish.	At					
100-150	f	as	I	conTnued	to	rotate,	we	got	the	sTck	
shaker.	The	ﬁrst	oﬃcer	noTced	the	no	ﬂap	condi*on	and	
placed	the	ﬂaps	to	5.	(No	takeoﬀ	warning	horn.		
Discovered	popped	circuit	breaker	back	at	the	gate)…”	



Inadvertent	(deadly)	
Procedural		Omissions	
Dismukes	(2006)	looked	at	27	major	aviaTon	
accidents	in	U.S.	(1987-2001)	in	which	crew	
error	cited	causal	or	contribuTng	factor	
	
Typical	examples	include	
•  Detroit	(1987):	DC-9	crashed	shortly	a@er	take-oﬀ		
–  NTSB:		Flaps/slats	not	set	to	take-oﬀ	posiTon	
•  Dallas	(1988):	B-727	crashed	shortly	a@er	take-oﬀ	
–  NTSB:	Flaps/slats	not	set	to	take-oﬀ	posiTon	
•  LaGuardia	(1994):		MD-82	ran	oﬀ	runway	end	a@er	high-speed	rejected	take-oﬀ	
–  NTSB:	pitot	heat	not	turned	on	-	anomalous	airspeed	indicaTons		
•  Houston	(1996):		DC-9	landed	gear-up	
–  NTSB:		Hydraulic	pump	not	set	to	high	posiTon	
•  LiNle	Rock	(1999):	MD-80	crashed	into	approach	lights	at	departure	end	of	runway	
–  NTSB:	ground	spoilers	not	armed	before	landing	(combinaTon	with	other	
errors)	
Were	these	accidents	unique?	
•  No,	they	are	just	the	Tp	of	the	iceberg	
	
	
ASRS	reports	tell	us	about:	
•  Rejected	take-oﬀ	–	forgot	ﬂaps	
•  Runway	incursion	–	forgot	to	monitor	
•  Broken	tow-bar	–	forgot	to	clear	pushback	crew	
•  Taxiing	into	a	ditch	–	forgot		to	brief	
•  Engine	ﬂame-out	–	forgot	to	stop	fuel	transfer	
•  DeparTng	with	inadequate	fuel	–	forgot	to	check	on	preﬂight	
•  Leaving	APU	running	during	takeoﬀ	–	forgot	checklist	item	
•  Took	oﬀ	without	PDC	–	forgot	to	request	
•  Deviated	from	speed	or	alTtude	restricTon	–	forgot	to	enter	on	MCP	
•  Flying	wrong	departure	route	–	forgot	to	follow	new	instrucTons	
=>	Compromises	to	safety	
=>	Unnecessary	costs	and	delays	
Are	pilots	alone?	
Is	AviaTon	alone?	
No.	
	
We	see	the	same	problems	
in	all	high-risk	
industries.	
	

Data	Sources	
Personal	ﬂying	experience	
Many	diﬀerent	jumpseat	observaTons	
•  Airline	Training	
•  Analysis	of	FOMs,	SOPs,	&	Checklists	
•  Analysis	of	accident	and	incident	reports	
	
•  Extensive	interacTon	with	parTcipaTng	
carriers	and	others.	
Data	Sources	
Structured	Jumpseat	ObservaTons	and	crew	
interviews	
	
•  Two	major	US	carriers	
•  RouTne,	revenue	ﬂights,	B737	
•  1-2	hour	legs;	3-day	trips	
•  All	phases	of	ﬂight	
•  All	over	the	country	(domesTc	ops)	
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Pilot calls when ready Pilot is ready 
AcTviTes	are:	
•  Linear:	task	B	always	follows	task	A,	in	a	ﬁxed
	sequence	
•  Controllable:		tasks	iniTated	by	each	pilot,	
	independently,	at	their	choice	
•  Predictable:	informaTon	available	when	
	needed,	communicaTons	possible		when	
necessary	
In	THEORY…	
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Taxi.. in reality 
≠ 
	 	IDEAL										 	 		is	diﬀerent	from						 	 		REAL	
OK,	so	What?	
•  Pilots	(and	others)	become	accustomed	to	
concurrent	task	demands,	interrupTons,	
distracTons	and	disrupTons.	
and	the	truth	is	…	
•  Pilots	(and	others)	rouTnely	manage	
mulTple,	compeTng,	concurrent	task	
demands	just	ﬁne…		
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The	reality	of	cockpit	operaTons	
Constant	presence	of	Perturba*ons	that:	
•  Interrupt	ongoing	ac*vity	
•  Force	tasks	to	be	performed	outside	their	normal	
	(habitual)	sequence	
•  Give	rise	to	new,	unan*cipated	tasks	
	
ImplicaTons:	
•  ANen*on	diverted,	even	if	for	split	second	
•  Ac*ons	and	tasks	suspended	
•  Ac*ons	and	tasks	deferred	
•  Ac*ons	and	tasks	interleaved	
•  Deferred	tasks	must	be	remembered	later	
•  …There	is	no	PAUSE	buNon!	
Vulnerable	to	Omissions	when…	
(4	Prototypical	Situa0ons)	•  Interrupted	
–  e.g.,	interrupted	while	conducTng	a	checklist	–															 	
	forget	to	return	to	line	item	at	which	interrupted	
•  Must	perform	tasks	outside	normal	(habitual)	
	sequence	
–  e.g.,	defer	sesng	ﬂaps	unTl	reaching	runway	for		 	
	takeoﬀ	because	of	slush	on	taxiway	–	forget	to	 	 	
	extend	ﬂaps	before	takeoﬀ	
•  Must	perform	new,	unan*cipated	tasks	(in	lieu	of	
habitual	acTons)		
–  e.g.,	ﬂy	diﬀerent	heading	than	normal	upon	departure	–								
	 	forget	to	comply	with	new	instrucTon	and	ﬂy	 	 	
	usual	heading	instead	
•  Must	interleave	mul*ple	tasks	
–  e.g.,	re-program	FMC	during	taxi	–	forget	to	monitor	 	
	aircraf	
OK,	but	WHY?	
	Individuals	forget	to	act	because	
the	cogniTve	demands	of	these	
situaTons	interact	with	the	ways	
in	which	the	human	brain	
processes	informaTon.	
The	hidden	complexity	of	cockpit	operaTons	
•  Complexity	is	not	just	a	macer	of	workload	
•  SituaTons	appear	diverse	but	share	underlying	
features	that	involve:	
Mul*tasking:	mulTple	tasks,	concurrently	
	
•  Pilots	(all	humans)	cannot	mul*task	well	
	 	yet	they	typically	do	it:	
• without	a	second	thought	
• without	an	appreciaTon	of	their	true	(in)ability	
• with	an	incomplete	understanding	of	the	risks	they	
are	taking	when	doing	so	
The	MulTtasking	Myth	
•  We	typically	overesTmate	our	ability	to	mul*task	
•  In	reality,	our	ability	to	mulTtask	is	a	funcTon	of:	
–  the	degree	to	which	tasks	are	pracTced	together	
–  the	degree	to	which	each	individual	task	requires	
	conscious	eﬀort	and	acenTon	
–  the	cues	available	to	prompt	recall	of	intended	acTons		
•  MulTtasking	situaTons	substanTally	increase	our	
	vulnerability	to	errors	
–  Common	error:	forgesng/failing	to	perform	a 	
	procedural	step	
–  Common	error:	inacenTon	(being	distracted)	

Additional Information: 
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